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Introduction 
In a recent paper the authors proposed that the work of Hannah Arendt could be 
employed to provide a productive understanding of how it is that systemic ‘moral 
catastrophes’ can occur in modern health care systems (Roberts & Ion, 2014). From an 
Arendtian perspective the widespread participation of practitioners in those catastrophes - 
such as that typified by the events at Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust (see, e.g. Francis, 
2013) - cannot coherently be understood by invoking notions of ‘inherent evil’ or 
‘wickedness’ but should rather to be understood as a consequence of an ‘authentic 
inability to think’ or ‘thoughtlessness’ (Arendt, 1992; p. 288). In particular, Arendt’s 
work suggests that in so far as modern health care systems are increasingly characterised 
by instrumental rationality - a rationality that necessitates practitioners exercise their 
technical skills in accordance with institutional rules, policies and procedures and do so 
in a manner that seeks to continually maximise efficiency - then those practitioners 
become progressively habituated to thoughltlessness, habituated to the unreflective 
employment of the most efficient means to a given end without considered reflection on 
the moral appropriateness of the means employed or the ends pursued. As a response to 
such thoughtlessness, Arendt (1971) posits the need for what she refers to simply as 
‘thinking’ and presents a characterisation of the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates as an 
exemplary instantiation of that thinking which can serve as a corrective to the 
thoughtlessness that is associated with instrumental, rule-governed rationality (p. 427). 
Accordingly, this paper will seek to elucidate Arendt’s account of Socrates in order to 
begin to develop the implications of that characterisation for the providers of health care 
education. In particular, it will suggest that the development of what can be referred to as 
a ‘Socratic ethos’ in health care students may challenge the thoughtlessness that is 
associated with instrumental rationality and prevent the widespread thoughtless 
participation of health care practitioners in systemic moral catastrophes.   
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Arendt’s Socrates 
In seeking to employ Socrates as instantiation of a thinking that can disrupt 
thoughtlessness - and while noting the scholarly difficulties in assigning a representative 
function to an historical figure (Arendt, 1971, p. 427) - Arendt presents a characterisation 
of Socrates in Thinking and Moral Considerations that is congruent with that presented 
by Plato (1961a) in The Apology. On trial and defending himself against the charge of 
‘corrupting the minds of the young, and of believing in deities of his own invention 
instead of the gods recognized by the state’, Socrates is presented as giving a detailed 
account of the philosophical activity upon which he has been engaged throughout Athens 
and which has led to him incurring the widespread resentment of Athenian ‘professional 
men and politicians’ (Plato, 1961a; p. 10). In elucidating the nature of this philosophical 
activity - that Socratic, reflective rationality or thinking that is presented as challenging 
the thoughtlessness that is associated with instrumental, rule-governed rationality - 
Arendt (1971) notes that the characteristic methodological approach that Socrates 
employed involved calling into question those seemingly simple words or concepts that 
are part of our everyday speech, words such as ‘happiness, courage, justice, etc.’ and 
which become elusive and ‘slippery’ when we try and define them (p. 429). In particular, 
Socrates was concerned with questioning those Athenians who had a ‘high reputation for 
wisdom’ to see if they could provide a coherent account of what they meant when they 
employed those everyday terms and, through such questioning, to examine if their high 
reputation for wisdom was warranted (Plato, 1961a; p. 7). In doing so, however, Socrates 
suggests that he not only discovered that the high reputation of the professional men and 
politicians of Athens was unwarranted, not only were they unable to provide coherent 
accounts of what they meant when they employed those everyday terms, but their lack of 
wisdom was compounded in so far as they believed that they possessed a level of wisdom 
that they manifestly did not (Plato, 1961a; pp. 7-8). 
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In beginning to consider the implications of Arendt’s employment of Socrates for 
the providers of health care education, however, it is important to note that the value of 
Socrates’ thinking for Arendt does not rest on the specific content of that thinking that 
Plato’s dialogues recount. Arendt ought not to be understood as choosing Socrates 
because of the particular everyday concepts that he called into question, such as 
happiness, courage and justice, and neither is the particular method of cross examination 
that Socrates employed, the elenchus, central to the manner in which Socrates’ activity 
can serve as a model for disrupting the thoughtless, widespread participation in systemic 
moral catastrophes. Indeed, in seeking to continually question the knowledge and the 
wisdom of others, Socrates did not seek to assert his own wisdom by providing 
definitions of everyday concepts, nor did he seek to teach a method, a set of doctrines or 
a body of knowledge the truth of which he sought to convince others (see, e.g. Colaiaco, 
2002; Johnson, 2012; Miller, 2012). As Arendt (1971) makes clear, ‘Socrates, as he 
repeatedly said, did not teach anything for the simple reason that he had nothing to teach’ 
(pp. 431-432). Moreover, within the context of the increasing predominance of 
instrumental rationality in modern health care systems - and, in particular, the demand for 
health care professionals to efficiently exercise their technical skills in accordance with 
specific sets of rules, procedures and protocols - the thinking, reflective questioning that 
Arendt (1971) presents as Socrates’ philosophical activity is often understood as 
‘unproductive’ and even ‘entirely without results’ (p. 431). For example, in highlighting 
the ‘aporetic’ character of this activity, the manner in which Plato’s Socratic dialogues 
either ‘lead nowhere’ or go ‘round in circles’, Arendt (1971) proposes that ‘thinking as 
such does society little good, much less than the thirst for knowledge in which it is used 
as an instrument for other purposes’ such that, ‘except in emergencies’, the questioning 
that characterises Socratic reflective rationality must be understood as ‘a marginal affair 
for society at large’ (p. 445).  
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The Socratic Ethos 
Despite suggesting that Socrates ‘had nothing to teach’ and that his philosophical activity 
can be understood as ‘aporetic’, Arendt (1971) is clear that the activity upon which he 
was engaged continues to possess a contemporary significance, value and worth (pp. 445-
446). However, rather than evaluating that worth in terms of the specific content of 
Socrates’ thought or the particular method of questioning that he employed, the value of 
Socrates for Arendt is to be understood as residing in the particular ethos that he 
instantiated. While an individual’s ethos, understood in its ancient, Greek sense, 
incorporates that which manifests itself in a person’s way of acting and responding to 
events, a way visible to others, it is not to be understood as being reducible to that way of 
acting or responding to events; rather, a person’s ethos refers to their character and 
disposition towards things, an attitudinal stance towards the world or what might be 
referred to as a person’s mode or way of being (Foucault, 2000; p. 286). The value of 
Socrates as a representative model is therefore to be understood as residing in the 
particular ethos that he instantiated, in his possession of an attitude or way of being that 
was disposed to question the seemingly self-evident ‘truths’ of everyday life, to call into 
question that which is regarded as ‘common sense’ and what ‘everybody is supposed to 
know’. It is this Socratic ethos or disposition that maintains a contemporary significance 
for Arendt precisely because it has the ability to disrupt the habituated thoughtlessness 
that can be associated with the instrumental, rule-governed rationality that increasingly 
directs the everyday conduct of individuals within a given organisation or regime. In 
highlighting the ability of this ethos to disrupt the unreflective, rule-governed 
engagement in everyday activities, Arendt (1971) makes it clear that it manifests itself as 
‘the stop and think’ such that this questioning ethos or disposition may produce ‘a 
paralyzing effect’ that entails you are ‘no longer sure of what seemed to you beyond 
doubt while you were unthinkingly engaged in whatever you were doing’ (p. 434). 
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 In considering the implications of Arendt’s characterisation of Socrates for the 
providers of health care education, it is therefore important to note that the emphasis 
ought to be on facilitating the development of a Socratic ethos in health care students 
rather than attempting to duplicate the technical methods of questioning that he 
employed. The teaching of Socrates’ method of questioning, or even more general skills 
of critical reflection, will be of limited value in seeking to challenge the thoughtless 
participation of health care practitioners in systemic moral catastrophes if those 
individuals do not possess the particular ethos that disposes them to employ those skills 
and question the seemingly unquestionable truths of the organisation within which they 
are situated. Rather, it is the development of an ethos or disposition to question that may 
challenge the thoughtlessness that can lead to systemic moral catastrophes in modern 
health care systems, a Socratic ethos that arises from an engaged suspicion towards all 
claims of what can be referred to as epistemological certitude, finality or closure, a 
suspicion towards any individual, professional body or organisation that effectively 
maintains that its knowledge base, procedures or protocols are, in theory or in practice, 
beyond question. Indeed, in accordance with much contemporary thought in the spheres 
of religion, politics, philosophy and science (see, e.g. Lyotard, 1997; Vattimo, 1999; 
Rorty, 2007; Kuhn, 2012), Arendt (1971) proposes that the long-standing, traditional 
intellectual pursuit of seeking to establish epistemological certitude, the variegated claims 
to have established, discerned or ‘uncovered’ truths that are effectively indubitable, has 
‘lost plausibility’, ‘fallen into disrepute’ and ‘come to an end’ (pp. 419-421). The ethos 
that Arendt suggests Socrates instantiates is, in this respect, strikingly contemporary in so 
far as he maintained that he knew nothing of such epistemological certitude and that 
knowledge claims that were ostensibly unquestionable would have to be the reserve of a 
God, whereas the knowledge that human beings could possess would always be 
provisional, subject to revision and forever open to question (Plato, 1961a; p. 9).  
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Facilitating the development of a Socaratic ethos  
For health care professionals to ‘stop and think’, for health care professionals not to 
become progressively habituated to the unreflective employment of the most efficient 
means to a given end without considered reflection on the moral appropriateness of the 
means employed or the ends pursued, then it is necessary to facilitate the development of 
this Socratic ethos in health care students. However, in contrast to the teaching of 
technical skills and the assessment of their safe, effective and efficient performance, the 
facilitation of an ethos that instantiates an active suspicion towards claims of 
epistemological certitude, an ethos that disposes students to question that which is 
ostensibly unquestionable, presents a significant challenge to the providers of health care 
education. Indeed, in highlighting this difficulty, Arendt (1971) proposes that there is 
only one way that such a Socratic ethos can be taught, the only way in which she suggests 
that Socrates can be understood as having taught anything, and that is by presenting and 
sharing ‘perplexities’ with others (p. 431). That is, in order to facilitate the development 
of a reflective, questioning ethos or disposition, then it is necessary to present critical 
debates and issues to students, to seek to identify the uncertainties, controversies and 
perplexities that surround the theoretical foundations and clinical interventions that 
characterize contemporary health care. Moreover, the presenting and sharing of such 
perplexities, as Socrates himself made clear (Plato, 1961b; p. 363), does not entail 
presenting those perplexities from a position of expertise such that ‘the educator’ then 
reveals the supposed answer or solution that resolves the perplexity. Rather, congruent 
with the description of Socrates as a perplexed man who reduced others to perplexity 
(Plato, 1961b; p. 363), the facilitation of a disposition to question is made by an educator 
who is genuinely disposed to carry out a joint investigation into perplexities, valuing the 
contribution of students as co-inquisitors and, by doing so, creates a climate in which 
students feel empowered, validated and disposed to engage in reflective questioning.       
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While facilitating the development of such a Socratic ethos involves creating a 
climate in which students feel empowered to question, those responsible for health care 
education also face the challenge of considering how to encourage students to exercise 
that disposition, and consider the consequences of exercising that disposition, in 
environments that are less receptive to such questioning. Indeed, Socrates’ account at his 
trial of the manner in which his philosophical activity elicited bitter and persistent 
hostility from individuals, along with the judgment passed on him at the end of that trial 
by the professional men and politicians of Athens, vividly illustrates how individuals and 
organisations can react to the reflective, questioning ethos that he instantiated (Plato, 
1961a; p. 9, p. 23). Similarly, Arendt (1971) highlights the manner in which the 
Athenians accused Socrates of being dangerously subversive and corrosive, and that the 
activity upon which he was engaged ‘sweeps away all the established signs by which men 
orient themselves in the world; it brings disorder into the cities and it confuses the 
citizens, especially the young ones’ (p. 436). To the extent that an individual, 
professional body or organisation has an interest in maintaining its authority and 
reputation for knowledge, and within the context of the increasing predominance of 
instrumental, rule-governed rationality in modern health care systems, then the 
questioning disposition that Socrates instantiated may be regarded as a distraction or 
annoyance at best and, at worst, as a dangerous and subversive challenge to the 
legitimacy and the efficient functioning of the organisation. To facilitate the development 
of a Socratic ethos in health care students, therefore, does not merely necessitate the 
development of an attitude of suspicion to claims of epistemological certitude, but also 
the development of the courage to actively engage that suspicion and ask questions of 
individuals, professional bodies and organisations who may have a multiplicity of 
historical, socio-political and institutional reasons to maintain the seemingly self-evident 
and unquestionable status of their knowledge base, procedures and protocols.    
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Conclusion 
Despite the challenges confronting those who would seek to facilitate the development of 
a Socratic ethos in health care students, Arendt’s work is clear that such a disposition can 
serve as a corrective to the authentic inability to think or thoughtlessness that can be 
associated with the instrumental, rule-governed rationality that increasingly characterises 
modern health care organisations. Moreover, in contrast to the possession of technical, 
specialised health care skills and the increasingly efficient employment of those skills in 
accordance with organsiational rules, policies and produces, the development of that 
reflective, questioning disposition towards ostensibly self-evident truths that Arendt 
refers to simply as thinking is to be understood as a general attribute of all. As she makes 
clear: ‘Thinking in the non-cognitive, non-specialized sense…is not a prerogative of the 
few but an everpresent faculty of everybody’ (Arendt, 1971; p. 445). While modern 
health care systems require practitioners to possess and exercise technical skills in order 
to ensure the most effective and efficient means to a given end, the prevention of 
widespread, systemic participation in moral catastrophes also necessitates that they 
possess an ethos that disposes them, when necessary and in the face of individual, 
professional and organisational resistance, to actively call into question the moral 
appropriateness of the means being employed or the ends being pursued. Therefore, as an 
everpresent faculty or attribute of everybody that may disrupt thoughtless, unreflective 
and widespread participation in systemic moral catastrophes in health care, Arendt’s 
work entails that the providers of health care education seriously consider how to 
facilitate the development and active engagement of a Socratic ethos in health care 
students, how this can be set alongside the educational demands of facilitating the 
acquisition of specialised knowledge and technical health care skills and, finally, how the 
two can coexist in health care systems that are increasingly characterised by instrumental, 
rule-governed rationality. 
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